Open the Gates: University of Manitoba 2017 Convocation Speech, Dr. Thomas Denton

On June 8, 2017 Thomas Ralston Denton received a Doctor of Laws, honoris causa, at the University of Manitoba's Spring Convocation.   I had the honour of reading the citation that reflected on Tom's 4 decades of resettling refugees.  He is known as the "godfather of refugee resettlement in Canada."  By all estimates, he has personally been involved in the private sponsorship of more than 40,000 refugees and helped to situate Winnipeg as the Canadian capital of privately sponsored refugees.  He has been the Executive Director of Hospitality House Refugee Ministry since 2006, a position he took on after a short lived retirement, and continues to be the face that welcomes new refugees to Canada at the airport.

Dr. Denton delivered a powerful, passionate and challenging speech to the graduands and has allowed the Migration Law Research Cluster to post it here:

Sixty-two years ago I spoke to my first university graduating class.  I was the class valedictorian.

I remember some of what I said - with the enthusiasm of youth: “Life is an adventure and ought to be lived adventurously.”

Today with the possibility of wisdom that is supposed to come with old age I would render that advice from 1955 a little differently:

“Life is obligation and ought to be lived responsibly.”

Your life will present obligations in many forms, whether they are to family, or society, or the planet.

The most remarkable thing that has happened in my lifetime has been the unfolding realization that the universe illustrates the definition of infinity.

Yet within that immensity, the photos of planet earth from space are the most beautiful thing I’ve seen.  We must look after our unique home.

It also strikes me daily that despite postulations about life “out there”, there is more life in my city backyard garden than what is yet proven beyond our planet.

I am a lawyer by training, and my various careers have always tapped into law’s teachings. The one great fundamental that I have learned is that laws are moral minimums. And they are no defense against sheer power.

My work in recent years has been in the fields of refugees and immigration. Canada is celebrating 150 years of existence as a nation, yet my family’s European roots on this continent were planted 15 generations ago, in the early 1600’s, long before there was a Canada.

My own Indigenous roots go back 12,000 years. This is my home, and my native land.

That is why it saddens me that for the past three generations we have operated Canada as a “gated community”, letting in “the right people” – a description that has changed from time to time. And in the “right” numbers.

It has cost us dearly.  Like Esau, we have squandered our birthright. He did it for a mess of potage.  We did it to protect vested interests.

Hear these facts:

In 1910, Prime Minister Wilfrid Laurier proclaimed that the 20^th century belonged to Canada.  He based that on the knowledge that Canada was then open to immigration.  He expected that Canada would reach 100 million by the year 2000.

In 1913 we welcomed 400,000 immigrants, equivalent to more than 5 % of our then population.  We have never achieved that number since.  Current landings are less than one percent.

In 1900 the United States had a population lead on us of 71 million.  Today it leads us by 290 million.  The state of California has four million more people than all of Canada.  You could fit California into the bottom two-thirds of Manitoba.

The reason is simple:  The US opened itself to immigration; Canada gated.

Had Laurier’s plans, and vision, been realized – today our population would be equivalent to Japan’s (125 million), one-and-a-half times that of Germany, and double that of the United Kingdom.(And you could fit those three countries into Ontario with room left over).

Those are three nations essentially without natural resources in the way that we tend to think of “natural resources”.  There is a fundamental difference:  they know that their people are their greatest “natural resource”.  We seem to have overlooked that.

Think what these population numbers could have meant for Canada as a power – and a role model – on the world stage.  And we wouldn’t be essentially defenseless as we are now. (The US military is 22 times the size of ours). Laws are moral minimums and no defense against sheer power.

But there is another aspect to this.  Most have forgotten or never knew that we closed our doors to the sponsoring of one’s relatives under the “assisted relatives class” a quarter century ago. We cancelled the program.

The only avenue left for sponsoring a brother or a sister (and only if they’re refugees), is the tiny and numerically inadequate “private sponsorship of refugees” program.

We have created an underclass of new Canadians numbering in the millions who are unable to reunite their families, even when their relatives are suffering the extremes of the refugee experience. These Canadians want one thing: “let my people in”.  But the laws don’t permit. Is this a civil rights issue? Laws are moral minimums.

We know that the annual demand to get into Canada is likely three times what the annual “levels plan” of successive national governments has permitted.  My challenge to you, (the next generation following the three that have kept us “gated”), is to open those gates - and let people in.

Please see that as your obligation – and your adventure. Make Canada your “vested interest”.

And make us truly great.

Lies, Damn Lies, and Prosecutorial Abuse

How easy should it be for the state to strip an individual of their citizenship? For instance, is it fair or reasonable that a naturalized citizen can be stripped of her citizenship in a criminal proceeding based on an immaterial false statement? Maslenjak v United States, a case currently being considered by the United States Supreme Court, raises such questions.

Before discussing the case, it’s worth noting the value placed on citizenship and why it should be difficult to strip someone of citizenship – whether through criminal or civil proceedings – once it has been acquired. As the Supreme Court stated in Federenko, “the right to acquire American citizenship is a precious one, and that, once citizenship has been acquired, its loss can have severe and unsettling consequences.” Among its various benefits, citizenship allows individuals to fully partake in the political life of the country or locality through voting and/or standing for office. The government cannot deport a citizen for committing even a serious crime – a fate often reserved for non-citizens who have committed such crimes. States cannot just banish citizens as punishment for crimes.

As important as citizenship is often considered, it is not irrevocable for those who acquire it through naturalization (as opposed, for example, to those who acquire it by birth on American soil). Federal law provides that naturalized citizens may face criminal liability for certain conduct they have engaged in when acquiring citizenship with de-naturalization as a consequence of a guilty verdict. 18 USC §1425(a) provides that a person is criminally liable if s/he “knowingly procures or attempts to procure, contrary to law, the naturalization of any person, or documentary or other evidence of naturalization or of citizenship.” Should this include the providing of false statements, even where they had or would have had no material impact in the procurement of citizenship?

In addition to the punishment(s) one faces for being convicted of this crime, the consequences also include stripping an individual of their citizenship through de-naturalization. Under 8 USC §1451(e), when “a person shall be convicted under section 1425 of title 18 of knowingly procuring naturalization in violation of law, the court in which such conviction is had shall thereupon revoke, set aside, and declare void the final order admitting such person to citizenship, and shall declare the certificate of naturalization of such person to be canceled. Jurisdiction is conferred on the courts having jurisdiction of the trial of such offense to make such adjudication.” Notably, the mandatory nature of the word “shall” indicates that de-naturalization does not permit any measure of discretion.

Returning to the case, the facts in Maslenjak are relatively straightforward. Divna Maslenjak arrived in the United States in 2000 and sought refugee status arguing that she and her family had a well-founded fear of persecution in her native Bosnia for reasons connected to her husband’s alleged refusal to be conscripted in the Serbian militia (this turned out to be a fabrication) as well as their ethnicity as Serbs living in a Muslim-dominated area of Bosnia. The family was granted refugee status (though it is unclear on which basis) and subsequently Maslenjak applied for naturalization after being resident in the United States for a set number of years mandated by statute. She acquired citizenship. However, it turns out that rather than evading conscription, her husband was in fact an officer in a unit of the Serbian militia forces implicated in war crimes. Based on representations made during the immigration process, she was charged under §1425(a) and found guilty by a jury resulting in revocation of naturalization under §1451(e).

On appeal before the Federal Court of Appeals for the 6th Circuit, Maslenjak argued that the trial judge failed to properly instruct the jury that her false statements needed to be “material” (consistent with federal case law in other federal circuits) in order to convict her of procuring naturalization contrary to law. Contrary to the case law in other circuits, a three-judge panel of the 6th Circuit concluded that a conviction under §1425(a) did not require a finding that false statements made by a defendant needed to be “material”. Accordingly, even if Maslenjak made immaterial statements that would not have positively impacted her citizenship application, she could still be held criminally liable, and, if convicted, stripped of her citizenship. This interpretation contradicted well-established case law in other circuits (see e.g. US v Puerta, 982 F.2d 1297 (9th Cir. 1992)) where courts read into §1425(a) a requirement that misstatements be material given the gravity of the ultimate consequence of a finding of guilt (i.e. revocation of citizenship).

The Supreme Court heard oral arguments in the case on April 26th of this year (a recording with visual effects is available here). As always, questions from the justices (except from the perennially silent Clarence Thomas) flew at the lawyers fast and furiously.  I won’t summarize in detail every facet of the oral arguments before the Court. However some of the salient points are worth discussing.

One of the points raised when questioning Maslenjak’s counsel, Christopher Landau, was the viability of reading in a “materiality” standard in connection with making false statements in procuring naturalization. The language of §§1425(a) and 1451(e) clearly omit the word “material”. Meanwhile, under §1451(a), Congress specifically inserted the word “material” in connection with a civil de-naturalization process where naturalization was illegally procured or procured by concealment of a material fact or by willful misrepresentation. The fact that Congress left out such language of materiality in §§1425(a) and 1451(e) while inserting it in §1451(a) suggested that it did not intend for such standard to apply in the former sections.  In addition, it was pointed out to Landau that another federal criminal provision, 18 USC §1015, makes it a crime to knowingly make “any false statement under oath, in any case, proceeding, or matter relating to, or under, or by virtue of any law of the United States relating to naturalization, citizenship, or registry of aliens.” Noticeably, Congress did not require any materiality standard here either. However, the consequence of violating this provision (§1015) does not lead to automatic de-naturalization on conviction.

While the Court’s questioning of Landau suggested some doubts about the inclusion of a materiality standard, it nevertheless demonstrated considerable concerns about stripping a naturalized individual of their citizenship based on their procuring of naturalization through the telling of immaterial false information or concealment of immaterial information. In this regard, several justices directed various hypotheticals to the assistant Solicitor General Robert Parker. Chief Justice Roberts began this questioning by referring to question 22 of part 12 on the application form for naturalization (N-400) which states: “Have you EVER committed, assisted in committing, or attempted to commit, a crime or offense for which you were NOT arrested” (emphasis in original). The Chief Justice’s concern was with the breadth of this question as it relates to “offenses” (the exchange can be found here and the audio begins at 00:25:37 and ends around 00:28:32). Though Parker tried to stress that there are some ambiguities surrounding the meaning of crimes and offences, the Chief Justice pointed to Black’s Law Dictionary which defines an offense as “a violation of the law, a crime, often a minor one.” The Chief Justice asked whether, hypothetically, having knowingly exceeded the speed limit by 5 miles an hour and deliberately omitted that fact on such a form, federal authorities could knock on his door and attempt to revoke his citizenship. When Parker affirmed that the government’s position would indeed be that individuals are obliged to disclose such minor offenses, the Chief Justice responded as follows: “Oh, come on. You’re saying that on this form, you expect everyone to list every time in which they drove over the speed limit…except when they were arrested.” Parker affirmed that this was the government’s expectation. Justices Sotomayor and Breyer followed up with similar questions that illuminated concerns about the breadth of the questions that might be posed and the potential perils of deliberately answering incorrectly.

The Chief Justice later stated near the close of oral arguments that the larger danger of potential de-naturalization for failing to answer such broad questions was, namely, prosecutorial abuse. He asserted (at 0:52:52):

"If you take the position that refusing to -- not answering about the speeding ticket or the nickname [at 0:28:32 to 0:30:11] is enough to subject that person to denaturalization, the government will have the opportunity to denaturalize anyone they want, because everybody is going to have a situation where they didn't put in something like that -- or at least most people. And then the government can decide, we are going to denaturalize you for other reasons than what might appear on your naturalization form, or we're not. And that to me is – is troublesome to give that extraordinary power, which, essentially, is unlimited power, at least in most cases, to the government. That strikes me as a serious problem."

 Though it is hard to predict how the Court may ultimately decide based purely on comments made during oral arguments, the Chief Justice’s observations nevertheless identify a compelling concern. The way to limit such immense power in this case is to place restrictions through a reasonable interpretation of the language in the statute. The language of the provision (“knowingly procures or attempts to procure, contrary to law, the naturalization of any person”) suggests some nexus between procuring naturalization contrary to law and the naturalization of any person. Justice Kagan, during a lengthy exchange with Parker, posited the following rhetorical question: “how do you use that phrase in a statute and not mean that there has to be a relationship between the illegal acts and the procurement of naturalization?” Indeed, it may not be a “materiality” standard if Congress has used that term elsewhere and decided not to adopt it in the case of §1425(a). Yet this hardly means that no standard was contemplated. The context of denaturalization (a rather significant action) and the criminal nature of the statute suggests that it has to be something more substantial than an immaterial statement that procures naturalization. As Justice Ginsburg asked (at 0:39:13 to 43:49): “how can an immaterial statement procure naturalization?”

Assuming the Court ultimately rejects both the defendant’s position of a materiality standard and the government’s argument that that it need only prove that the person knowingly committed the wrongful act irrespective of the fact it was immaterial to the decision-making process, we are left with options somewhere in the middle. Justice Breyer proffered some during oral argument to Parker (0:41:40 to 0:43:50) which suggested that in order to succeed the government should be required to prove that the falsehood advanced by the defendant had a tendency or possibility to influence the decision maker. The definition of materiality, which the Court had adopted in an earlier decision (Kungys), was that the statement in question had a natural tendency to produce the conclusion that the applicant was qualified for citizenship.

The serious consequences that transpire as a result of a conviction arising from §1425(a) include not only a potential prison sentence, but automatic de-naturalization under §1451(e). Coupled with language in §1425(a), which is highly and logically indicative of a nexus between the deliberate (non-)disclosure of information and procuring naturalization, a requirement that the government prove a nexus is compelling. Building on the articulation that Justice Breyer expressed during oral arguments, perhaps a more suitable standard might be one where the statement was likely or more probable (rather than had a tendency or possibility) to have influenced the decision-maker. The use of the word “influence” rather than “produce”, which the Court adopted in Kungys, does not require the Government to show that the statement(s) had a tendency to “produce”, as opposed to “influence”. Language which requires some nexus on this basis falls short of the standard for materiality but requires more than what the 6th Circuit would require – which is essentially nothing in terms of a nexus between the act that is contrary to law and procuring nationalization.

While oral arguments were largely focused on matters of statutory interpretation and the broader implications of the government’s position, some discussion of the particular facts from the case did arise. It is worth noting that a few Justices were openly skeptical as to whether Maslenjak would have succeeded at trial even under a materiality standard articulated by her counsel. Justice Ginsburg appeared to suggest that the failure to instruct the jury on the issue of materiality may well have been a harmless error since even under a materiality standard, a well instructed jury would not have found in her favor. Justice Alito expressed doubt that a well-instructed jury would conclude that failing to include information that your husband committed atrocities would be an immaterial consideration. Landau conceded that this might be a significant challenge on remand, but nevertheless, he argued that the jury should decide whether the statement was immaterial. Furthermore, there was some doubt as to whether refugee status was secured based on the false statement regarding the evasion of conscription or based on the attacks suffered by the family on account of their Serb identity.

The Court’s ultimate interpretation of §1425 may have serious ramifications going forward for any number of naturalized citizens. The ability of the government to abuse the immense power that Chief Justice Roberts identified needs to be checked and bounded.

Appendix

8 USC § 1101(f)(6)

(f) For the purposes of this chapter—

No person shall be regarded as, or found to be, a person of good moral character who, during the period for which good moral character is required to be established is, or was—

(6) one who has given false testimony for the purpose of obtaining any benefits under this chapter;

8 USC § 1451(a)

(a) Concealment of material evidence; refusal to testify

It shall be the duty of the United States attorneys for the respective districts, upon affidavit showing good cause therefor, to institute proceedings in any district court of the United States in the judicial district in which the naturalized citizen may reside at the time of bringing suit, for the purpose of revoking and setting aside the order admitting such person to citizenship and canceling the certificate of naturalization on the ground that such order and certificate of naturalization were illegally procured or were procured by concealment of a material fact or by willful misrepresentation, and such revocation and setting aside of the order admitting such person to citizenship and such canceling of certificate of naturalization shall be effective as of the original date of the order and certificate, respectively: Provided, That refusal on the part of a naturalized citizen within a period of ten years following his naturalization to testify as a witness in any proceeding before a congressional committee concerning his subversive activities, in a case where such person has been convicted of contempt for such refusal, shall be held to constitute a ground for revocation of such person’s naturalization under this subsection as having been procured by concealment of a material fact or by willful misrepresentation. If the naturalized citizen does not reside in any judicial district in the United States at the time of bringing such suit, the proceedings may be instituted in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia or in the United States district court in the judicial district in which such person last had his residence.

18 USC § 1015

(a) Whoever knowingly makes any false statement under oath, in any case, proceeding, or matter relating to, or under, or by virtue of any law of the United States relating to naturalization, citizenship, or registry of aliens;


Cross-posted at http://www.robsoncrim.com/single-post/2017/06/07/Lies-Damn-Lies-and-Prosecutorial-Abuse 

 

Canadian Crimmigration: How Ill-Perceived Presumptions and Threats Shape Migrant Detention by James Gacek

Much like our Western counterparts, Canada has entered into a new era where the norm is to unfortunately treat many immigrants and refugees as “interlopers, illegals, threats to security, or criminals” (Gros & van Groll, 2015, p. 13). Referred to migration experts as the criminalization of immigration—or ‘crimmigration’—this new norm blurs the borders between immigration law, migration management, criminal law and crime control. This ongoing process is seen by some scholars as quite sinister, as crimmigration logics are highly centred upon ill-perceived precautionary philosophies and illusory presumptions about migrants. In effect, such logics are becoming more normative, infiltrating the politics of cities and hindering the lives of immigrants and refugees attempting to settle in Canada (c.f. Molnar & Silverman, 2016).

Expanding carceral regimes and migration controlling measures and practices have led to the rise in immigration detention, and crimmigration logics expand the discretionary powers of administrative tribunals regulating migration governance. Every year, thousands of migrants who are not serving a criminal sentence are, in effect, imprisoned. While some migrants are detained because of past criminality, the majority of the immigration detainee group are not. Some of these people are extremely vulnerable with varying immigration statuses, such as asylum-seekers, minors, pregnant women, victims of trauma or torture, and persons with physical and/or mental disabilities (c.f. Gros & van Groll, 2015).

However, nowhere is the crimmigration reality more stark than in the area of immigration detention. Migrants can be detained for several reasons, such as lack of documents, and unable to confirm their identity; ‘irregular arrival’ to the country via smugglers; labelled a ‘flight risk’, or as a ‘danger’ to the Canadian public (Kanji, 2016). Canada’s Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (S.C. 2001, c.27), federal legislation which deals with the protection of immigrants and refugees, is anything but clear and definitive for both immigrant and refugee admissibility into the country and the protection of migrants and refugees while held within Canada’s immigration detention centres (Ross, 2014). Because immigration law is a civil domain, rights protections are not a predominant concern for immigrants as we see afforded to criminal suspects; simply put, there are no readings of one’s rights, no direct or automatic access to legal counsel (or even a telephone in some cases), and no prompt meetings to explain how to apply for release (Silverman & Nethery, 2015, cited in Molnar & Silverman, 2016). 

Precautionary and presumptive logics have influenced the IRPA to such an extent that the legislation, like the Charter, could be argued as becoming another legitimate legal technology of surveillance which makes visible and governs immigrants and refugees (c.f. Jochelson et al., 2014; Jochelson & Doerksen, 2017). Indeed, migrants attempting to make Canada their new home have seen an increased difficulty in the post-9/11 era, and these discretionary administrative practices (based upon fear and suspicion of the Other) clearly erode civil liberties and jeopardize the rights of those immigrants detained. 

Of course, Canada is entitled to detain (at least briefly) persons who are reasonably suspected of posing a risk to the country’s safety and security. However, there must be purpose in the detention of migrants, based upon specific factual and empirical context. Too often has been the case in the West that migrant detention is somehow a “national prerogative that can be automatically exercised” without any real regard for fairness and accountability (Gros & van Groll, 2015, p. 1). 

Fortunately, the detention of immigrants and their potential subjection to deportation has been problematized through a plethora of legal challenges, and there have been exemplary lawyers and civil liberties’ associations taking up the call to resist ill-perceived, precautionary philosophies driving crimmigration. However, resisting is no easy task. Legal activism and reform must progress onward to combat the presumptive and precautionary logics at play within the IRPA and Canada’s immigration policies. More than ever, the procedural wings of state intervention into the lives of immigrants and refugees warrants further investigation. The bureaucratization of human rights unfortunately arises out of a philosophy which mobilizes fear-based and surveillant logics. If not reversed, the wrongfulness of routine migrant detention will be much more than an issue of illegality; crimmigration will diminish the ability of the state to act as a force of good, a good which reflects the best about us, for the foreseeable future. 

References:

Gros, H. & van Groll, P. (2015). “We Have No Rights”: Arbitrary imprisonment and cruel treatment of migrants with mental health issues in Canada. International Human Rights Program: University of Toronto, Faculty of Law.

Jochelson, R. & Doerksen, M. (2017). “The Supreme Court Presents: The Surveillant Charter and the Judicial Creation of Police Powers in Canada.” Pp. 75-97 In National Security, Surveillance, and Terror: Canadian and Australian Sovereignty Compared, edited by R. Lippert, I. Warren, K. Walby, and D. Palmer. London: Palgrave-MacMillan Press. 

Jochelson, R., Kramar, K., & Doerksen, M. (2014). The Disappearance of Criminal Law: Police Powers and the Supreme Court. Winnipeg and Halifax: Fernwood Publishing. 

Kanji, A. “These borders kill: Canada’s lethal immigration system.” Rabble.ca: March 30. Available at: http://rabble.ca/news/2016/03/these-borders-kill-canadas-lethal-immigration-system. 

Molnar, P. & Silverman, S. J. (2016). “Cracks Where the Light Gets in: Recent Legal Breakthroughs in Detention and Crimmigration in Canada.” MetroPolitics.eu: December 6^th. Available at:  http://www.metropolitiques.eu/Cracks-Where-the-Light-Gets-in.html.

Ross, O. (2014). “In Canada’s immigration law, anyone can be a terrorist.” The Star: April 27. 

Legislation cited:

 

Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (S.C. 2001, c.27). 

© 2017 James Gacek

James Gacek is a PhD candidate at the University of Edinburgh, Edinburgh Law School. While his research interests are many, his work can be generally categorized within the realms of socio-spatiality, socio-legality and socio-sexuality. He has begun to publish in the areas of incarceration, genocide carcerality, film and media studies, cultural and visual criminology, exploitative relationships between human and animals, and emerging Canadian state surveillance. James is an American Sociological Association Student paper award recipient (2014).

Building Bridges Between Canada’s Indigenous and Newcomer Groups by Shauna Labman

On May 12-13 a gathering “Building Bridges Between Canada’s Indigenous and Newcomer Groups” took place at Circle of Life Thunderbird House in Winnipeg that brought together individuals, community workers, artists, advocates, and academics keen to build relations and understandings in the city. A small CBC piece on the event has generated almost 400 shares.  I want to use this forum to offer further clarity on the origins of the meeting, a summary of discussions, and possibilities moving forward. 

The event was originally conceived out of the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council’s funding call for grant proposals “Connecting for Canada’s 150^th”.  As Canada approaches this grand birthday, discussion has swirled around what precisely this marker celebrates, what it blurs, and what it ignores at a time when reconciliation is both an ambition and a challenge.  In the same moment, Canada is welcoming refugees with targeted resettlement programs for Syrian and now Yazidi refugees and struggling with its reaction to asylum seekers entering irregularly from the United States. 

The Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada made specific Calls to Action concerning Newcomers to Canada:

93. We call upon the federal government, in collaboration with the national Aboriginal    organizations, to revise the information kit for newcomers to Canada and its citizenship test to reflect a more inclusive history of the diverse Aboriginal peoples of Canada, including information about the Treaties and the history of residential schools.

94. We call upon the Government of Canada to replace the Oath of Citizenship with the following: I swear (or affirm) that I will be faithful and bear true allegiance to Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth II, Queen of Canada, Her Heirs and Successors, and that I will faithfully observe the laws of Canada including Treaties with Indigenous Peoples, and fulfill my duties as a Canadian citizen.

It is also important for all Canadians to understand Canada’s international obligations and domestic commitments to refugees.  Thus with Canada’s 150^th on the horizon, it made sense to focus on the oldest and newest inhabitants of the land that now makes up Canada and their relationships with each other.  For me, thinking about these issues side by side raised questions on the meaning of home. What does it mean to be home, to fight for your home, to lose your home, to create a new home?

In a city like Winnipeg, the physical homes of indigenous and newcomer groups are often side by side in core neighbourhoods.  I am on the Board of Directors at the Immigrant and Refugee Community Organization of Manitoba (IRCOM).  IRCOM has operated an apartment building on Ellen Street since 1991 that offers transitional housing to newcomers to Winnipeg in their first year of residence and extending up to 3 years. The grand opening for IRCOM’s second location, on Isabel Street, will take place next week on June 5, 2017.  IRCOM has sought to nurture strong indigenous – newcomer relations as a strategic priority since 2015.  As a practical matter, hosting this gathering struck me as a way to support this effort.

Participants came to the conference with a wealth of knowledge, working relationships, and insight.  The goal of the event was to strengthen these connections, fill in gaps, and broaden the reach of collaborations.  We commenced the first day with an opening prayer and the Kairos Blanket Exercise as an active experience of the historical and contemporary relationship between indigenous and non-indigenous peoples in Canada and ended the day with a facilitated refugee myth-busting exercise.  On the second day we invited speakers from across Canada working on similar bridge building and closed with art, music and dance as a celebration. Robson Hall law students served as attentive note-takers throughout the two days and a full report that hopes to capture the diverse perspectives shared, the commonalities, misconceptions, and points of conflict or contention in the panels will follow shortly.  

It proved unnecessary to pursue funding through the SSHRC grant as the University of Manitoba generously funded the event through the Legal Research Institute, the Dean of Law, and the Conference Sponsorship Program.  While I served as the lead organizer on behalf of the Migration Law Research Cluster, the two days were planned through collaboration with the National Research Centre for Truth and Reconciliation (Aimée Craft), the Faculty of Social Work (Regine King) and IRCOM (Shereen Denetto).  Law students Madison Pearlman and Danielle Morrison were hired to turn a proposal into a reality and worked closely with Jessica Praznik from the Immigrant Centre Manitoba to navigate the logistical details.

It is important to recognize the university’s role in the event as an opportunity for outreach and relationship building as well.  Rather than holding the event on campus, we hosted the event at Thunderbird House to both bring the university to the community and allow conference participants to familiarize themselves with the space as well as the vision and principles tied to its construction. During the conference we facilitated a “Skills and Knowledge Exchange Bank” where in the listing of resources it was noted that academics are physical resources able to provide information and insight.  When the Migration Law Research Cluster hosted an event focussed on “Building Connections: Refugee Research and Community Outreach” in 2014, issues were raised with respect to demands sometimes put on NGOs to facilitate academic research and the lack of post research advocacy or assistance.  It has been an objective of the MLRC from the outset to build knowledge and understanding and to foster interdisciplinary collaboration and community engagement through monthly noon hour speakers, social media, and larger community conferences. The Building Bridges conference was both an outgrowth of earlier events and itself a means to extend our own reach and connection into the community.  On behalf of the MLRC, I invite you to keep the conversation going  and be in touch with us.  I look forward to what comes next!