Tuesday, 24 November 2015

LES DÉPLACÉS DES CHAGOS. RETOUR SUR LA LUTTE DE CES HABITANTS POUR RÉCUPÉRER LEUR TERRE ANCESTRALE BY Caecilia Alexandre & Konstantia Koutouki

In the most recent edition of the Quebec Journal of International Law (La Revue québécoise de droit international), the QJIL published an article entitled "LES DÉPLACÉS DES CHA GOS . RETOUR SUR LA LUTTE  DE  CES HABITANTS  POUR RÉCUPÉRER LEUR  TERRE  ANCESTRALE" and written by Caecilia Alexandre & Professor Konstantia Koutouki. The following is the English abstract of the article:

This article gives us a complete overview of the little known story of the Chagos archipelago, a story which is vital to the understanding of why the former inhabitants of the archipelago are fighting so vigorously to return home following the installation of an Anglo-American military base on one of the archipelago’s islands, Diego Garcia and why their right to return is well-founded under national and international legal principles. This article also discusses the political context of the installation of the military base and how this impacts the options the Chagossians have on national and international levels to defend their rights.      

Saturday, 12 September 2015

Sponsors are doing more while the Canadian government does less

A drowned boy has angered the world. In Canada this is mingled with the particular knowledge that an effort to sponsor the Kurdi family to Canada failed. As Canadians we wish more had been done and want to do more. Everyone is talking about sponsoring refugees. We are reminded in the media that this is the Canadian way. If this moment of realization brings more Canadians into the sponsorship community, this is cause for hope and increased protection. But individual Canadians do not, and should not, bear the weight of responsibility here.

Responsibility lies with the Canadian government and while individual Canadians have already been doing more, the government is increasingly doing less.

Canada, like other countries, offers a government resettlement program that brings refugees to Canada. This is in contrast to refugees arriving in Canada on their own and claiming asylum. Resettlement is a means of recognizing that not all refugees can cross borders to safety, and that certain parts of the world face greater refugee flows than others. In Canada, we are particularly far away and hard to get to. The Syrian refugees now flooding into Europe by the thousands highlight just how far Canada is from this crisis.

Private sponsorship, unique to Canada, was created almost 40 years ago as a complement to the Canadian government program of refugee resettlement. Sponsors use the term “additionality” and a statement by the Canadian Refugee Sponsorship Agreement Holders Association on September 4, 2015 concluded, “All private sponsorships should be in addition to the Government’s commitment.” Yet it seems that the Canadian government has forgotten this concept of additionality over the last 5 years.

In 2010, the government announced an increase to Canada’s resettlement program of up to 2,500 spaces per year. A cause for celebration, except that only 500 spots were government and 2,000 were private sponsorship. For the numbers to be realized, sponsors would be responsible for 80% of the increase and costs. With the 2012 Budget, the government shifted 1,000 refugee spaces from the government program to private sponsors. In 2013, the government announced an initial commitment to resettle 1,300 Syrian refugees by the end of 2014. This number included a mere 200 government spots with the remaining 1,100 refugees expected to arrive through private sponsorship. The private sponsorship commitment, made on behalf of sponsors by the Canadian government, was the 5th largest confirmed pledge for the admission of Syrian refugees received by UNHCR by June 2014. The Canadian government promise meanwhile ranked 10th. While the government can increase quotas and announce grand expansions, with the numbers allocated to private sponsorship, it remains up to individual Canadians to voluntarily take on the personal and financial responsibility to bring the refugees to Canada

The current government promise to resettle 10,000 Syrian refugees is not a new response. This number was announced back in January, is spread out over 3 years, and once again put 60% of the responsibility on private sponsors. A further campaign pledge of 10,000 refugees “from the region” was made in early August and new promises are now being made. While this will bring some Syrians to safety in Canada, the arrivals will remain the result of private efforts and not an engaged government response.

As the government asks sponsors to shoulder more responsibility for resettlement, one would assume they are making sponsorship easier. And yet the opposite is true. A 2011 change that limits eligibility for certain sponsorships to refugees recognized by UNHCR or a state reportedly stymied the Kurdi family. This sort of recognition is a practical impossibility for UNHCR in mass flow populations such as Syrians. The government also introduced caps on submissions in 2011 and 2012 rather than increased resources to address an application backlog. Essentially, sponsors want to resettle too many people.

When the government cut refugee health care in 2012, it reduced the care for privately sponsored refugees to urgent or essential services only while refugees resettled by the government retained extended coverage. Even following a successful challenge of the health care cuts in federal court, interim measures introduced by the government still offer less health coverage to privately sponsored refugees than to the refugees resettled by the government.

Private sponsorship is an incredible tool for Canadians to offer protection to refugees in need. The private response should be a powerful signal to the government to do more. Instead the government asks more and offers less. Rather than additionality, sponsors face the reality that if they don’t act, fewer refugees will arrive in Canada. So, please, gather your friends and start sponsoring, but demand of our government that they too do more.

Friday, 4 September 2015

Robert Barsky's New Book - Undocumented Immigrants in an Era of Arbitrary Law: The Flight and the Plight of People Deemed 'Illegal'

Routledge is publishing Robert Barksy's new book, Undocumented Immigrants in an Era of Arbitrary Law: The Flight and the Plight of People Deemed 'Illegal'. The following is the description from Routledge's website:

This book describes the experiences of undocumented migrants, all around the world, bringing to life the challenges they face from the moment they consider leaving their country of origin, until the time they are deported back to it. Drawing on a broad array of academic studies, including law, interpretation and translation studies, border studies, human rights, communication, critical discourse analysis and sociology, Robert Barsky argues that the arrays of actions that are taken against undocumented migrants are often arbitrary, and exercised by an array of officials who can and do exercise considerable discretion, both positive and negative. 

Employing insights from a decade-long research project, Barsky also finds that every stop along the migrant’s pathway into, and inside of, the host country is strewn with language issues, relating to intercultural communication, interpretation, gossip, hearsay, and the challenges of peddling of linguistic wares in the social discourse marketplace. These language issues are almost always impediments to anodyne or productive interactions with host country officials, particularly on the "front-lines" where migrants encounter border patrol and law enforcement officers without adequate means of communicating their situation or understanding their rights. Since undocumented people are categorized as ‘illegal’, they can be subjected to abuse and exploitation by host country officials, who can choose to either tolerate or punish them on the basis of unpredictable, changeable, and even illusory or "arbitrary" laws and regulations. 

Citing experts at every level of the undocumented immigrant apparatuses worldwide, from public defenders to interpreters, Barsky concludes that the only viable policy to address prevailing abuses and inequalities is to move towards open borders, an approach that would address prevailing issues and, surprisingly, provide security and economic benefits to both host and home countries.
A short excerpt from the introduction to the book may be viewed here.

Tuesday, 28 July 2015

"Human Rights, Climate Change, and Cross-Border Displacement" by Jane McAdam and Marc Limon

A new policy report has been published by the Universal Rights Group and was written by Jane McAdam and Marc Limon.

The report is entitled: "Human Rights, Climate Change, and Cross-Border Displacement: The Role of the International Human Rights Community in Contributing to Effective and Just Solutions." It is available here.

The following is a brief description which also available here:

The links between climate change and human rights are more widely accepted than ever before. The Human Rights Council has adopted a series of resolutions calling attention to the effects of climate change on the full enjoyment of human rights, and the Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC has also recognised that ‘the adverse effects of climate change have a range of direct and indirect implications for the effective enjoyment of human rights.’ While climate change impacts have implications for the human rights of individuals in all parts of the world, it is well established that the rights of those in already vulnerable situations are at particular risk. As sea levels rise and extreme weather events increase in frequency and magnitude, more and more people in such situations are expected to be displaced by disasters, some of them across international borders.

And yet, despite a growing recognition of the human rights implications of climate change, including in the context of human displacement, and despite an understanding that adherence to international human rights commitments and principles can help to strengthen policymaking in response to global warming, relatively few concrete steps have been taken to bring a human rights perspective to climate negotiations. Likewise, beyond expressing concern about a possible human rights protection gap for the increasing number of people who are expected to be displaced across borders in the context of climate change, the international community has not done enough to consider how to fill that gap. This Policy Report is an important step towards clarifying what UN bodies can and should do to begin to safeguard human rights against the effects of climate change, including in the context of human displacement.

Thursday, 23 July 2015

New Issue of Refuge on Making Homes and Forced Migration

Refuge published a new issue in April 2015 dedicated to the theme of home-making and displacement.  The full issue can be found here. The abstract to the introductory chapter written by  Cathrine Brun and Anita Fábos and entitled "Making Homes in Limbo? A Conceptual Framework" is as follows:

This article aims to conceptualize home and homemaking for people in protracted displacement. The article serves three purposes: to present an overview of the area of inquiry; to develop an analytical framework for under- standing home and homemaking for forced migrants in protracted displacement; and to introduce the special issue. It explores how protracted displacement has been defined—from policy definitions to people’s experiences of protractedness, including “waiting” and “the permanence of temporariness.” The article identifies the ambivalence embedded in experiences and practices of homemaking in long-term displacement, demonstrating how static notions of home and displacement might be unsettled. It achieves this through examining relationships between mobility and stasis, the material and symbolic, between the past, present, and future, and multiple places and scales. The article proposes a conceptual framework—a triadic constellation of home—that enables an analysis of home in different contexts of protracted displacement. The framework helps to explore home both as an idea and a practice, distinguishing among three elements: “home” as the day-to-day practices of homemaking, “Home” as representing values, traditions, memories, and feelings of home, and the broader political and historical contexts in which “HOME” is understood in the current global order and embedded in institutions. In conclusion, the article argues that a feminist and dynamic understanding of home-Home-HOME provides a more holistic perspective of making home in protracted displacement that promotes a more extensive and more sophisticated academic work, policies, and practices.

Saturday, 11 July 2015

The Criminalization of Immigration in the United States by Drs. Walter Ewing, Daniel Martinez and Ruben Rumbaut

The American Immigration Council recently published a report entitled: "The Criminalization of Immigration in the United States" written by Drs. Walter Ewing, Daniel Martinez and Ruben Rumbaut. 


The following is an excerpt from the Executive Summary:

For more than a century, innumerable studies have confirmed two simple yet powerful truths about the relationship between immigration and crime: immigrants are less likely to commit serious crimes or be behind bars than the native-born, and high rates of immigration are associated with lower rates of violent crime and property crime. This holds true for both legal immigrants and the unauthorized, regardless of their country of origin or level of education. In other words, the overwhelming majority of immigrants are not “criminals” by any commonly accepted definition of the term. For this reason, harsh immigration policies are not effective in fighting crime.

Unfortunately, immigration policy is frequently shaped more by fear and stereotype than by empirical evidence. As a result, immigrants have the stigma of “criminality” ascribed to them by an ever-evolving assortment of laws and immigration-enforcement mechanisms. Put differently, immigrants are being defined more and more as threats. Whole new classes of “felonies” have been created which apply only to immigrants, deportation has become a punishment for even minor offenses, and policies aimed at trying to end unauthorized immigration have been made more punitive rather than more rational and practical. In short, immigrants themselves are being criminalized.

Saturday, 4 July 2015

"The Endriago Subject and the Dislocation of State Attribution in Human Rights Discourse: The Case of Mexican Asylum Claims in Canada" by Ariadna Estévez

Third World Quarterly has recently published "The Endriago Subject and the Dislocation of State Attribution in Human Rights Discourse: The Case of Mexican Asylum Claims in Canada" by Ariadna Estévez. It is available here: http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/CTwZYHGXjJ6FwVtTcRDX/full#.VZg6cOdzdW0

The following is the abstract:

Mexico is arguably immersed in an unprecedented wave of violence in which drug cartels and law enforcement officials at times work together in cases of forced disappearance, kidnapping, execution, torture, persecution and other atrocities considered violations of the most basic human rights, including the right to life and to physical integrity. However, these atrocities are only classified as human rights violations if they can be unequivocally attributed to the state; this is not always possible. Using Foucault’s idea of governmentality and Valencia’s concept of the Endriago as a subjectivity emerging from the specific governmentalisation of the Mexican state, this article examines how hybrid agents in Mexico – law enforcement officials working for criminal gangs or criminals working for the state – serve to subvert common understandings of attribution and responsibility in the state-centric discourse of human rights in general, and of the right of asylum in the specific case of Canada, a country to which thousands of Mexicans have fled.

Tuesday, 30 June 2015

Tough on Terror, Short on Nuance: Identifying the Use of Force as a Basis for Excluding Resisters Seeking Refugee Status by Amar Khoday

The Canadian Journal of Human Rights recently published an article of mine. The title and citation are "Tough on Terror, Short on Nuance: Identifying the Use of Force as a Basis for Excluding Resisters Seeking Refugee Status" (2015) 4:2 Can J Hum Rts 179.


The abstract is as follows:

The use of force has been a significant feature of many political struggles and resistance movements. The consequences for its participants may include the possibility of persecution, if not death. Some will flee and seek protection under the auspices of the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees. Since the attacks of September 11th 2001, governments in Australia, Canada and the United States have passed broad national security legislation that effectively renders such persons inadmissible or excluded for the purposes of acquiring refugee status. Regardless of context, the targeting of government actors and the use of proportionate means, all political violence under such legislation becomes invalid. In this article, the author takes the position that such legislation should be repealed. In its place, Article 1F(b) of the Convention can be used to exclude those who engage in serious non-political crimes while allowing those who perpetrate legitimate political crimes to obtain refugee status. Article 1F(b) is the perfect tool as the purpose of the provision was to protect political resisters while excluding those who failed to observe the distinction between civilians and legitimate targets or who adopted disproportionate means and methods. Prevailing political crimes jurisprudence demonstrates that courts and tribunals possess the capability to differentiate between uses of force that are legitimate while rejecting those  that are not. They have done so by engaging in nuanced and contextual analyses. 

Non-Refoulement in a World of Cooperative Deterrence by James Hathaway and Thomas Gammeltoft-Hansen

Professor James C. Hathaway and Dr. Thomas Gammeltoft-Hansen's recent work "Non-Refoulement in a World of Cooperative Deterrence" was published in the Columbia Journal of Transnational Law - (2016) 53:2 Colum J Transnat'l L 235. 

The abstract is as follows:

Developed states have what might charitably be called a schizophrenic attitude towards international refugee law. Determined to remain formally engaged with refugee law and yet unwavering in their commitment to avoid assuming their fair share of practical responsibilities under that regime, wealthier countries have embraced the politics of non-entrée, comprising efforts to keep refugees away from their territories but without formally resiling from treaty obligations. As the early generation of non-entrée practices — visa controls and carrier sanctions, the establishment of “international zones,” and high seas deterrence — have proved increasingly vulnerable to practical and legal challenges, new forms of non-entrée predicated on interstate cooperation have emerged in which deterrence is carried out by the authorities of the home or a transit state, or at least in their territory. The critical question we address here is whether such cooperation-based mechanisms of non-entrée are — as developed states seem to believe — capable of insulating them from legal liability in ways that the first generation of non-entrée strategies were not. We show that three evolving areas of international law — jurisdiction, shared responsibility, and liability for aiding or assisting — are likely to stymie many if not all of the new forms of non-entrée. Powerful states are thus faced with a trade-off between the efficiency of non-entrée mechanisms and the ability to avoid responsibility under international refugee law. If, as we believe probable, the preference for more rather than less control persists, legal challenges are likely to prove successful. Law will thus be in a position to serve a critical role in provoking a frank conversation about how to replace the duplicitous politics of nonentrée with a system predicated on the meaningful sharing of the burdens and responsibilities of refugee protection around the world.

Saturday, 27 June 2015

A Sometimes Dangerous Convergence: Refugee Law, Human Rights Law and the Meaning of 'Effective Protection' by Kate Ogg

A 2013 article written by Kate Ogg and entitled, "A Sometimes Dangerous Convergence: Refugee Law, Human Rights Law and the Meaning of 'Effective Protection'" was published in the Macquarie Law Journal.

The following is the abstract:     


In late 2011 the High Court of Australia and the European Court of Justice made rulings on the conditions under which asylum seekers can be transferred to a third country. The High Court of Australia held that asylum seekers cannot be transferred unless they will be protected from persecution and be entitled to all of the rights outlined in the Refugee Convention. However, four months later the European Court of Justice set the threshold much lower. It ruled that a transfer could occur unless the asylum seeker would be subject to persecution or inhuman or degrading treatment. These sharply contrasting decisions raise wider issues for refugee protection especially in light of the desire for a harmonious interpretation of the Refugee Convention. Such a result is also surprising given the proliferation of human rights instruments and jurisprudence in the European Union, compared to Australia’s lack of a national human rights framework. This article will use these cases to demonstrate that, while some courts have drawn on principles of human rights law to progressively interpret the Refugee Convention, the nature of protection in the Refugee Convention is both distinct from and beyond the preservation of fundamental human rights. Accordingly, reference to principles of human rights law in transfer decisions can have the counter-productive effect of lowering the threshold for ‘effective protection’. This raises the need for critical examination of the boundaries of human rights and refugee law and consideration of the extent to which they should remain distinct bodies of law.

Wednesday, 24 June 2015

Designated Inhospitality: The Treatment of Asylum Seekers Who Arrive by Boat in Canada and Australia by Luke Taylor

A recent article written by Luke Taylor and entitled, "Designated Inhospitality: The Treatment of Asylum Seekers Who Arrive by Boat in Canada and Australia" was published in the McGill Law Journal - (2015) 60:2 McGill LJ 333.   The following is the English abstract:


This paper argues that there are distinct parallels between changes to the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act enacted by Bill C-31 (2012),  in particular the Designated Foreign National regime (DFN), and Australia’s treatment of asylum seekers who arrive by boat. It is contended that recent Australian history and policy demonstrate the perils of adopting an ideology of control and exclusion toward asylum seekers instead of a politics of hospitality, and that Australia’s present political climate provides a stark and salutary warning to Canada, as it follows a similar path of securitization. The paper first explains what is meant by a politics of hospitality. In Part I, it analyzes Australia’s attitude toward, and its treatment of, asylum seekers, focusing in particular on the period since 1989. It is argued that Australia’s inhospitable stance toward asylum seekers has had discernible negative outcomes that provide important les-sons for Canada. Part II provides a brief historical overview of Canadian policy toward asylum seekers, followed by an analysis of the DFN regime with reference to international law. It then argues that the DFN provisions contravene the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. The paper concludes by suggesting that Canada is at risk of following Australia’s security-oriented, inhospitable stance toward asylum seekers.

Tuesday, 23 June 2015

De-Constructing Marginality with Displaced People: Learning Rights from an Actor-Oriented Perspective by Maro Pantazidou*

A recent article in the Oxford Journal of Human Rights Practice

De-Constructing Marginality with Displaced People: Learning Rights from an Actor-Oriented Perspective by Maro Pantazidou

The article can be found here:

http://jhrp.oxfordjournals.org/content/5/2/267.full 

Here is the abstract:


In this article, I reflect on the lessons learned from a one year action-research process with displaced people in London to advocate for an actor-oriented approach to human rights education. I suggest that when it comes to supporting marginalized people to claim their rights, we need not to look for a transferable set of skills and knowledge but to nurture a rights consciousness – a sense of entitlement to one's rights – through transformative learning methodologies. The article discusses both the content and pedagogy of such methodologies, paying special attention to critical reflection and affective learning. I conclude that for us as human rights educators to engage in transformative learning for human rights we need to approach rights as rooted in the relationships, contextual realities, and perspectives of the people we work for and with, and I suggest that the way we understand rights incurs a set of implications for the way we ‘teach’ and claim them.

Friday, 19 June 2015

"We Have No Rights": Arbitrary Imprisonment and Cruel Treatment of Migrants with Mental Health Issues in Canada by the University of Toronto's International Human Rights Program

The University of Toronto's International Human Rights Program (IHRP) just released a report concerning the Canada Border Services Agency’s treatment of non-citizens with mental health issues. The report can be found here: http://ihrp.law.utoronto.ca/utfl_file/count/PUBLICATIONS/IHRP%20We%20Have%20No%20Rights%20Report%20web%20170615.pdf

The following is a synopsis from the IHRP's web page:
(Toronto) – The International Human Rights Program’s latest report says that Canada Border Services Agency’s treatment of non-citizens with mental health issues is in breach of Canada’s international human rights obligations as it is discriminatory, constitutes indefinite and arbitrary detention, is cruel and inhuman, and violates the right to health.

“We have no rights”: Arbitrary Imprisonment and Cruel Treatment of Migrants with Mental Health Issues in Canada finds that the CBSA routinely detains migrants with mental health issues in maximum-security jails—sometimes for years—despite their vulnerable and non-criminal status.
“Our report reveals shocking gaps in the rule of law,” says Renu Mandhane, IHRP executive director. “CBSA transfers migrants who are not serving a criminal sentence to provincial jails in the absence of adequate laws, regulations, or policies. Counsel are not given notice and detainees do not have an opportunity to challenge confinement in maximum security conditions despite the catastrophic impact imprisonment has on their mental health.”

"We have no rights", released in advance of World Refugee Day on June 20, profiles detainees who have been imprisoned between two months and eight years. IHRP researchers travelled to three Ontario jails to interview detainees and collect these “voices from the inside.” Overwhelmingly, the detainees communicated despair and anxiety over their immigration status, their seemingly indefinite detention, their lack of legal rights, their conditions of confinement, and the lack of adequate mental health treatment to allow them to get better.

Thursday, 11 June 2015

"UNHCR’s Involvement with IDPs: – ‘Protection of that Country’ for the Purposes of Precluding Refugee Status?" by Bríd Ní Ghráinne*

An interesting 2014 article by Bríd Ní Ghráinne in the International  Journal of Refugee Law on the issue of state protection and internally displaced persons.  Abstract appears below.

Bríd Ní Ghráinne, "UNHCR’s Involvement with IDPs: – ‘Protection of that Country’ for the Purposes of Precluding Refugee Status?" (2014) 26:4 Int J Refugee Law 536.



The absence of protection from persecution is a precondition to qualifying as a refugee. However, protection is not solely provided by states and may stem from non-state actors (NSAs) such as international organizations. This article will examine whether such protection may be substituted for ‘protection of that country’ and, if so, under what circumstances, and whether it may thus preclude the application of the Refugee Convention. The focus will be on the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees owing to its significant role in the protection of Internally Displaced Persons, persons who often go on to make a refugee claim upon fleeing the state. The article will first put forward an interpretation of the term ‘protection of that country’, by examining the refugee definition, in particular the meaning of the terms ‘that country’ and ‘protection’; by analysing relevant principles of EU law; and by outlining how these concepts have been elaborated by relevant jurisprudence on international organizations. The second half of the article will analyse the legal basis and scope of UNHCR’s mandate with IDPs, and will conclude by illustrating the reasons why the activities of UNHCR cannot constitute ‘protection of that country’ for the purposes of precluding the application of the refugee definition.

Duress and The Material Support For Terrorism Exclusion: When Moral Involuntariness Is Not Enough


I. Introduction  


Terrorist organizations are not known for tackling issues with a soft touch. This includes their treatment of those who refuse to be conscripted into their organizations. Such resisters often face persecution or death for their defiance. Through forced conscription they are compelled to provide assistance knowing that it will aid the organization. Some may manage to escape and seek refugee status in another country. 

This poses a critical question - should such individuals who are forced to provide assistance to terrorist organizations be excluded from obtaining refugee status? The question is particularly relevant under United States refugee law and this post will tackle it by examining a very recent United States Federal Court of Appeal decision from the 3rd Circuit based in Philadelphia. 

II. Sesay v Attorney General of the United States [1]


a. Facts


Sesay is a citizen of the west African state of Sierra Leone. In the late 1990s and early 2000s, the country was gripped in a civil war. The Revolutionary United Front (RUF) was dedicated to overthrowing the government through the use of force and managed to occupy the capital of Freetown. In 2001, three members of the RUF entered Sesay’s family home in Freetown. They sought to conscript him. Although Sesay refused, he was nevertheless forcibly taken. 

Over the course of a month, Sesay consistently refused to join; he was beaten for his resistance. After a month, the RUF attempted to train him to use firearms but he once again refused. The RUF instead decided to force him to assist them by transporting and carrying weapons. He did so under compulsion and under the supervision of armed guards. On one occasion, Sesay was able to escape while the rebels were being threatened by an aerial attack. He fled to Guinea and subsequently to Gambia before escaping to the United States. 

b. The Immigration Judge's Decision and the Administrative Appeal


The Immigration Judge (IJ) found Sesay to be credible and concluded that he suffered past persecution as a result of his membership in a particular social group – specifically, individuals who vocally opposed forced conscription into the RUF. Where an individual has suffered past persecution, there is a rebuttable presumption that s/he has a well-founded fear of future persecution. The IJ concluded that the presumption in this case could be rebutted since, at the time the decision was being made, the RUF had been disbanded and reconciliation efforts in Sierra Leone had since been successful.

In the alternative (and this is where it becomes relevant for the present discussion), the IJ also concluded that Sesay provided material support to the RUF, and determined that it was a terrorist organization. This was based on the fact that Sesay carried food, water, weapons, and ammunition for the RUF. The IJ held that there was no exception to this exclusion even where the support was based on duress.

Sesay appealed this decision to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA). The BIA affirmed the IJ’s decision.    


c. The 3rd Circuit's Decision


The 3rd Circuit affirmed the decisions of the BIA and IJ. It concluded, based on previous 3rd Circuit jurisprudence, and those of sister federal circuit courts of appeals (as persuasive authority) that the material support exclusion to obtaining refugee status applied in this case. Sesay had knowledge (a subjective standard) that his acts would provide material support or that he should have reasonably known (an objective standard) that his acts would provide material support for terrorist activities. The fact that he did not desire that the RUF succeed was irrelevant to this assessment. 

The Court accepted that Sesay provided this material support under duress. However, it was deciding for the first time (within in its jurisdiction) whether the fact of duress provided a sufficient exception to the material support exclusion. It concluded, based on its statutory analysis, that the presence of duress did not provide an exception to the material support exclusion. 

i. Text and Context


The Court first began with a textual analysis of the provisions in question. The relevant portions of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) render an individual inadmissible if they engage in terrorist activity 
in an individual capacity or as a member of an organization— to commit an act that the actor knows, or reasonably should know, affords material support [to a terrorist organization]... .[2] 
This provision is silent on whether duress provides an exception to the material support exclusion. However, the Sesay Court identified that there is an exception in the INA to the material support exclusion where "the actor can demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that the actor did not know, and should not reasonably have known, that the organization was a terrorist organization."[3] Drawing from a 9th Circuit discussion on this very issue, the Sesay Court concluded that had Congress intended that compelled conduct should be an exception, it would have certainly included this in the INA. Furthermore, in other provisions of the INA, Congress has included “involuntariness” as criteria for exempting individuals for another exclusion.[4] The Court rationalized that because the exemption for compelled conduct was specifically employed elsewhere in the INA, Congress clearly intended not to insert an exception for compulsion in connection with the material support exclusion.[5]

ii. Executive Branch Waivers 


Through legislation, United States federal law permits the Secretaries of State and Homeland Security to confer certain waivers to those who provided material support to certain terrorist organizations. However, the ability to grant this waiver is within the purview of the executive branch and specific cabinet secretaries. 

In conclusion, the Court determined that based on statute, it was up to the executive to grant waivers and the Court must not intervene in such determinations on matters of national security.

iii.  Circuit Court Consensus 


The Third Circuit noted that there was some degree of consensus amongst sister circuits on the issue of a duress exception - with one exception. In Ay v Holder, the 2nd Circuit determined that the statutory provisions in question (and referred to above) were silent on the issue of duress being an exception to the terrorism bar. The court stated that the "BIA's decision provides no analysis of the statutory question; rather, it appears to presume there is no duress exception."[6] As such, for the Ay Court it was possible for the BIA to interpret whether the provision in question excluded those who provided material support to terrorists by reason of compulsion. It remanded the case back to the BIA to “address the [statutory question] in the first instance in light of its own expertise.” As part of its own analysis, the 2nd Circuit neglected to address that Congress included an explicit exception (noted above) to the material support bar and consequently intended to exclude any exception for duress.

III. What is Problematic About All This?  


a. Overbreadth

First, let me start by stating that based on the text of the impugned provision and its relationship to other provisions, it was reasonable if not correct for the 3rd Circuit to hold that the material support exclusion does not include a duress exception. 

The problem is not the Court's interpretation but the provision itself. The breadth of the provision is indeed breathtaking. It is arguably intended to result in such harsh consequences. Congress likely knew exactly what it was doing post-9/11 and this comprehensive exclusion is reflective of the siege mentality that took root after September 11, 2001. 

The comprehensive and harsh nature of the anti-terrorist provisions in the INA has been noted in several quarters. For instance, James C. Hathaway and Michelle Foster assert that "states have adopted definitions of terrorist acts in the context of refugee and related immigration law that are startlingly broad, a concern perhaps most strikingly exemplified by legislation adopted in the United States."[7]

An example will help demonstrate Hathaway's and Foster's point. The notion of "terrorist activity" in the INA does not account for the political aims or the targets of certain acts. Almost any violent act can get wrapped into the definition of terrorist activity regardless of context. In Re SK, an asylum seeker provided money and some supplies to the Chin National Front, an organization which employed armed resistance against the repressive military junta in Myanmar. Given the scope of the legislation, SK was barred from obtaining refugee status. Juan Osuna, the current head of the BIA, writing then as a Vice-Chair in concurrence of SK's exclusion, criticized the breadth of the exclusion for terrorist activities. He stated: 

[T]he statutory language is breathtaking in its scope. Any group that has used a weapon for any purpose other than for personal monetary gain can, under this statute, be labeled a terrorist organization. This includes organizations that the United States Government has not thought of as terrorist organizations because their activities coincide with our foreign policy objectives.[8] 
With respect to the applicant in SK and the application of the material support bar, Osuna asserted:
In sum, what we have in this case is an individual who provided a relatively small amount of support to an organization that opposes one of the most repressive governments in the world, a government that is not recognized by the United States as legitimate and that has engaged in a brutal campaign against ethnic minorities. It is clear that [SK] poses no danger whatsoever to the national security of the United States. Indeed, by supporting the CNF in its resistance to the Burmese junta, it is arguable that the [SK] actually acted in a manner consistent with United States foreign policy. And yet we cannot ignore the clear language that Congress chose in the material support provisions; the statute that we are required to apply mandates that we find [SK] ineligible for asylum for having provided material support to a terrorist organization.[9] 
These passages provide the context for understanding why duress was left out as an exception to the material support bar for refugee status. The legislation was reactive and in large measure comprehensive in its seeming objectives - to exclude anyone who adopted or supported certain types of violence regardless of context or their reasons, however legitimate.  

b. Discourages Legitimate Resistance

The consequences can be potentially inhumane. A person who was compelled to commit unlawful acts will be excluded unless the executive branch elects to grant a waiver. In this case, we have an individual who resisted not only once but several times to actively join the organization and to use a weapon on its behalf. That he agreed to transport weapons, ammunition, food and water under the supervision of a guard speaks to the coerced nature of this assistance. He also left as soon as practicable. 

The decision not to include a duress exception sends a particular message to certain asylum seekers. It tells those who resist recruitment into terrorist (or similar) organizations, which commit international crimes, that unless they resist to the point of being killed, they will be refused refugee status if they manage to escape. As the late international jurist and legal scholar Antonio Cassese asserted in a dissenting opinion in the Erdemovic appeal before the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, "[l]aw is based on what society can reasonably expect of its members. It should not set intractable standards of behaviour which require mankind to perform acts of martyrdom, and brand as criminal any behaviour falling below those standards."[10] 

c. Inconsistent With The Human Rights Purpose of the Refugee Convention and Protocol

This lack of an exception is inconsistent with the overall human rights and humanitarian purpose of the 1951 Refugee Convention and/or the 1967 Protocol amending the Convention. Furthermore, the lack of an exception may be more punitive than a regular prison sentence for having committed the same crime. The consequences in these circumstances (refusal of refugee status) involve deportation and possibly persecution.

Endnotes



1. Sesay v Attorney General of the United States, --- F (3d) ----, 2015 WL 3372539 (3rd Cir 2015), online: <http://www2.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/142996p.pdf>.

2. 8 USC § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iv)(VI), online: <https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/8/1182>. 

3. 8 USC § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iv)(VI)(dd).

4. 8 USC § 1182(a)(3)(D). 

5. The reference to involuntariness as being synonymous to duress or compulsion may not be accurate. Involuntary conduct under traditional criminal law purposes serves as a complete defence to a crime. In the case of duress, such compulsion normally does not indicate the lack of voluntariness or for that matter the necessary mental state for the offence. However, it has been recognized (under Canadian law) that where there is the presence of duress, this may indicate a moral involuntariness. See R v Ryan, 2013 SCC 3 at para 23, [2013] 1 SCR 14.  

6. Ay v Holder, 743 F (3d) 317 at 320, online: <http://www.ca2.uscourts.gov/decisions/isysquery/947fad22-e8ab-4464-9001-5ee703743be4/28/doc/11-2102_opn.pdf>.   

7. James C Hathaway & Michelle Foster, The Law of Refugee Status, 2nd ed (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014) at 560. See also Geoff Gilbert, "Running Scared Since 9/11: Refugees, UNHCR and the Purposive Approach to Treaty Interpretation" in James C Simeon, ed, Critical Issues in International Refugee Law (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010). In a forthcoming article in the Canadian Journal of Human Rights, I criticize this and similar legislation in other countries for implementing legislative provisions which were unnecessary and certainly overly broad.

8. In Re SK, 23 I&N Dec 936 at 948 (BIA 2006), online: <http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/eoir/legacy/2014/07/25/3534.pdf>.

9. Ibid at 950. 

10. Prosecutor v Erdemovic (Pilica Farm Case), IT-96-22, Separate and Dissenting Opinion of Judge Cassese (7 October 1997) at para 47, online: <http://www.icty.org/x/cases/erdemovic/acjug/en/erd-adojcas971007e.pdf>. 

Saturday, 23 May 2015

The Passing of a great Canadian Refugee Law Scholar - Nicole LaViolette

It is with sadness that we have learned of the passing of Professor Nicole LaViolette of the University of Ottawa Law Faculty. 

Professor LaViolette was a prolific scholar whose work covered numerous areas of law. Amongst her various accomplishments was a sustained and profound scholarship concerning refugee law and the protection of sexual minorities.

Her work may be found at: https://uottawa.academia.edu/NicoleLaViolette  

We wish to offer our heartfelt condolences to her partner, family, friends and colleagues.