Tuesday, 30 June 2015

Tough on Terror, Short on Nuance: Identifying the Use of Force as a Basis for Excluding Resisters Seeking Refugee Status by Amar Khoday

The Canadian Journal of Human Rights recently published an article of mine. The title and citation are "Tough on Terror, Short on Nuance: Identifying the Use of Force as a Basis for Excluding Resisters Seeking Refugee Status" (2015) 4:2 Can J Hum Rts 179.


The abstract is as follows:

The use of force has been a significant feature of many political struggles and resistance movements. The consequences for its participants may include the possibility of persecution, if not death. Some will flee and seek protection under the auspices of the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees. Since the attacks of September 11th 2001, governments in Australia, Canada and the United States have passed broad national security legislation that effectively renders such persons inadmissible or excluded for the purposes of acquiring refugee status. Regardless of context, the targeting of government actors and the use of proportionate means, all political violence under such legislation becomes invalid. In this article, the author takes the position that such legislation should be repealed. In its place, Article 1F(b) of the Convention can be used to exclude those who engage in serious non-political crimes while allowing those who perpetrate legitimate political crimes to obtain refugee status. Article 1F(b) is the perfect tool as the purpose of the provision was to protect political resisters while excluding those who failed to observe the distinction between civilians and legitimate targets or who adopted disproportionate means and methods. Prevailing political crimes jurisprudence demonstrates that courts and tribunals possess the capability to differentiate between uses of force that are legitimate while rejecting those  that are not. They have done so by engaging in nuanced and contextual analyses. 

Non-Refoulement in a World of Cooperative Deterrence by James Hathaway and Thomas Gammeltoft-Hansen

Professor James C. Hathaway and Dr. Thomas Gammeltoft-Hansen's recent work "Non-Refoulement in a World of Cooperative Deterrence" was published in the Columbia Journal of Transnational Law - (2016) 53:2 Colum J Transnat'l L 235. 

The abstract is as follows:

Developed states have what might charitably be called a schizophrenic attitude towards international refugee law. Determined to remain formally engaged with refugee law and yet unwavering in their commitment to avoid assuming their fair share of practical responsibilities under that regime, wealthier countries have embraced the politics of non-entrée, comprising efforts to keep refugees away from their territories but without formally resiling from treaty obligations. As the early generation of non-entrée practices — visa controls and carrier sanctions, the establishment of “international zones,” and high seas deterrence — have proved increasingly vulnerable to practical and legal challenges, new forms of non-entrée predicated on interstate cooperation have emerged in which deterrence is carried out by the authorities of the home or a transit state, or at least in their territory. The critical question we address here is whether such cooperation-based mechanisms of non-entrée are — as developed states seem to believe — capable of insulating them from legal liability in ways that the first generation of non-entrée strategies were not. We show that three evolving areas of international law — jurisdiction, shared responsibility, and liability for aiding or assisting — are likely to stymie many if not all of the new forms of non-entrée. Powerful states are thus faced with a trade-off between the efficiency of non-entrée mechanisms and the ability to avoid responsibility under international refugee law. If, as we believe probable, the preference for more rather than less control persists, legal challenges are likely to prove successful. Law will thus be in a position to serve a critical role in provoking a frank conversation about how to replace the duplicitous politics of nonentrée with a system predicated on the meaningful sharing of the burdens and responsibilities of refugee protection around the world.

Saturday, 27 June 2015

A Sometimes Dangerous Convergence: Refugee Law, Human Rights Law and the Meaning of 'Effective Protection' by Kate Ogg

A 2013 article written by Kate Ogg and entitled, "A Sometimes Dangerous Convergence: Refugee Law, Human Rights Law and the Meaning of 'Effective Protection'" was published in the Macquarie Law Journal.

The following is the abstract:     


In late 2011 the High Court of Australia and the European Court of Justice made rulings on the conditions under which asylum seekers can be transferred to a third country. The High Court of Australia held that asylum seekers cannot be transferred unless they will be protected from persecution and be entitled to all of the rights outlined in the Refugee Convention. However, four months later the European Court of Justice set the threshold much lower. It ruled that a transfer could occur unless the asylum seeker would be subject to persecution or inhuman or degrading treatment. These sharply contrasting decisions raise wider issues for refugee protection especially in light of the desire for a harmonious interpretation of the Refugee Convention. Such a result is also surprising given the proliferation of human rights instruments and jurisprudence in the European Union, compared to Australia’s lack of a national human rights framework. This article will use these cases to demonstrate that, while some courts have drawn on principles of human rights law to progressively interpret the Refugee Convention, the nature of protection in the Refugee Convention is both distinct from and beyond the preservation of fundamental human rights. Accordingly, reference to principles of human rights law in transfer decisions can have the counter-productive effect of lowering the threshold for ‘effective protection’. This raises the need for critical examination of the boundaries of human rights and refugee law and consideration of the extent to which they should remain distinct bodies of law.

Wednesday, 24 June 2015

Designated Inhospitality: The Treatment of Asylum Seekers Who Arrive by Boat in Canada and Australia by Luke Taylor

A recent article written by Luke Taylor and entitled, "Designated Inhospitality: The Treatment of Asylum Seekers Who Arrive by Boat in Canada and Australia" was published in the McGill Law Journal - (2015) 60:2 McGill LJ 333.   The following is the English abstract:


This paper argues that there are distinct parallels between changes to the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act enacted by Bill C-31 (2012),  in particular the Designated Foreign National regime (DFN), and Australia’s treatment of asylum seekers who arrive by boat. It is contended that recent Australian history and policy demonstrate the perils of adopting an ideology of control and exclusion toward asylum seekers instead of a politics of hospitality, and that Australia’s present political climate provides a stark and salutary warning to Canada, as it follows a similar path of securitization. The paper first explains what is meant by a politics of hospitality. In Part I, it analyzes Australia’s attitude toward, and its treatment of, asylum seekers, focusing in particular on the period since 1989. It is argued that Australia’s inhospitable stance toward asylum seekers has had discernible negative outcomes that provide important les-sons for Canada. Part II provides a brief historical overview of Canadian policy toward asylum seekers, followed by an analysis of the DFN regime with reference to international law. It then argues that the DFN provisions contravene the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. The paper concludes by suggesting that Canada is at risk of following Australia’s security-oriented, inhospitable stance toward asylum seekers.

Tuesday, 23 June 2015

De-Constructing Marginality with Displaced People: Learning Rights from an Actor-Oriented Perspective by Maro Pantazidou*

A recent article in the Oxford Journal of Human Rights Practice

De-Constructing Marginality with Displaced People: Learning Rights from an Actor-Oriented Perspective by Maro Pantazidou

The article can be found here:

http://jhrp.oxfordjournals.org/content/5/2/267.full 

Here is the abstract:


In this article, I reflect on the lessons learned from a one year action-research process with displaced people in London to advocate for an actor-oriented approach to human rights education. I suggest that when it comes to supporting marginalized people to claim their rights, we need not to look for a transferable set of skills and knowledge but to nurture a rights consciousness – a sense of entitlement to one's rights – through transformative learning methodologies. The article discusses both the content and pedagogy of such methodologies, paying special attention to critical reflection and affective learning. I conclude that for us as human rights educators to engage in transformative learning for human rights we need to approach rights as rooted in the relationships, contextual realities, and perspectives of the people we work for and with, and I suggest that the way we understand rights incurs a set of implications for the way we ‘teach’ and claim them.

Friday, 19 June 2015

"We Have No Rights": Arbitrary Imprisonment and Cruel Treatment of Migrants with Mental Health Issues in Canada by the University of Toronto's International Human Rights Program

The University of Toronto's International Human Rights Program (IHRP) just released a report concerning the Canada Border Services Agency’s treatment of non-citizens with mental health issues. The report can be found here: http://ihrp.law.utoronto.ca/utfl_file/count/PUBLICATIONS/IHRP%20We%20Have%20No%20Rights%20Report%20web%20170615.pdf

The following is a synopsis from the IHRP's web page:
(Toronto) – The International Human Rights Program’s latest report says that Canada Border Services Agency’s treatment of non-citizens with mental health issues is in breach of Canada’s international human rights obligations as it is discriminatory, constitutes indefinite and arbitrary detention, is cruel and inhuman, and violates the right to health.

“We have no rights”: Arbitrary Imprisonment and Cruel Treatment of Migrants with Mental Health Issues in Canada finds that the CBSA routinely detains migrants with mental health issues in maximum-security jails—sometimes for years—despite their vulnerable and non-criminal status.
“Our report reveals shocking gaps in the rule of law,” says Renu Mandhane, IHRP executive director. “CBSA transfers migrants who are not serving a criminal sentence to provincial jails in the absence of adequate laws, regulations, or policies. Counsel are not given notice and detainees do not have an opportunity to challenge confinement in maximum security conditions despite the catastrophic impact imprisonment has on their mental health.”

"We have no rights", released in advance of World Refugee Day on June 20, profiles detainees who have been imprisoned between two months and eight years. IHRP researchers travelled to three Ontario jails to interview detainees and collect these “voices from the inside.” Overwhelmingly, the detainees communicated despair and anxiety over their immigration status, their seemingly indefinite detention, their lack of legal rights, their conditions of confinement, and the lack of adequate mental health treatment to allow them to get better.

Thursday, 11 June 2015

"UNHCR’s Involvement with IDPs: – ‘Protection of that Country’ for the Purposes of Precluding Refugee Status?" by Bríd Ní Ghráinne*

An interesting 2014 article by Bríd Ní Ghráinne in the International  Journal of Refugee Law on the issue of state protection and internally displaced persons.  Abstract appears below.

Bríd Ní Ghráinne, "UNHCR’s Involvement with IDPs: – ‘Protection of that Country’ for the Purposes of Precluding Refugee Status?" (2014) 26:4 Int J Refugee Law 536.



The absence of protection from persecution is a precondition to qualifying as a refugee. However, protection is not solely provided by states and may stem from non-state actors (NSAs) such as international organizations. This article will examine whether such protection may be substituted for ‘protection of that country’ and, if so, under what circumstances, and whether it may thus preclude the application of the Refugee Convention. The focus will be on the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees owing to its significant role in the protection of Internally Displaced Persons, persons who often go on to make a refugee claim upon fleeing the state. The article will first put forward an interpretation of the term ‘protection of that country’, by examining the refugee definition, in particular the meaning of the terms ‘that country’ and ‘protection’; by analysing relevant principles of EU law; and by outlining how these concepts have been elaborated by relevant jurisprudence on international organizations. The second half of the article will analyse the legal basis and scope of UNHCR’s mandate with IDPs, and will conclude by illustrating the reasons why the activities of UNHCR cannot constitute ‘protection of that country’ for the purposes of precluding the application of the refugee definition.