Friday, 20 May 2016

"On Narco-coyotaje: Illicit Regimes and Their Impacts on the US–Mexico Border" by Jeremy Slack and Howard Campbell

Jeremy Slack and Howard Campbell have written an interesting article entitled: "On Narco-coyotaje: Illicit Regimes and Their Impacts on the US–Mexico Border". The article will appear in a forthcoming issue of Antipode but is available here.  The following is an abstract:

Many have debated whether or not human smugglers, known as coyotes, are involved with drug trafficking organizations. Scholars have largely rejected so-called “narcocoyotaje”, however; we hope to problematize this narrative by adding a new theoretical layer to the discussion. Namely, we explore the ways in which different criminal activities produce hierarchies and control illicit activities within the clandestine geography of the US–Mexico border. These “illicit regimes” operate against the State, creating a hierarchy that dominates other illicit activities in order to maximize profit, avoid detection and consolidate power. While other studies have explored the relationships between the State and illicit practices this article takes the relationship between two illicit industries as its object of study. Doing so will help us move past the simply binary question about whether or not coyotes are involved with drug cartels, and allows us to understand what is being produced by this relationship, and its consequences for everyone involved.

 

Thursday, 19 May 2016

Targeting the Habitual Drunkard - The Case of Ledezma-Cosino v Lynch (9th Cir. 2016)


Does being a “habitual drunkard” mean that one lacks good moral character? You may be wondering how this question relates to migration or the law? After all, being a habitual drunkard, in and of itself, does not typically give rise to a violation of the law. 

The issue recently arose in a decision released on March 24, 2016 by the United States Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit (“the court” or “the 9th Circuit”). In Ledezma-Cosino v Lynch, the non-citizen applicant was subject to possible removal (i.e. deportation) proceedings. Although conceding his eligibility for removal, Ledezma-Cosino sought two forms of discretionary relief to escape such fate - (1) cancellation of removal; or (2) in the alternative, voluntary departure. The former allows an individual to remain in the United States while the latter would permit, among other benefits, the possibility of re-admission. However, there's a catch. Such discretionary relief is unavailable for those lacking good moral character. Congress dutifully provided a list of examples where someone lacked such character under 8 USC §1101(f). The first among that list is someone who is a habitual drunkard. 

The Immigration Judge who heard the matter in the first instance concluded, among other reasons, that Ledezma-Cosino was ineligible for the requested relief on account of his being a habitual drunkard. Focusing solely on this reason, the Board of Immigration Appeal affirmed the Immigration Judge's decision. Ledezma-Cosino appealed to the 9th Circuit. 

Before the court, Ledezma-Cosino argued that the statutory bar against habitual drunkards violated both the due process and the equal protection clauses of the 14th Amendment of the United States Constitution. Though the court quickly dispensed with the due process argument, it held that the provision in question violated Ledezma-Cosino's right to equal protection. Specifically, the court determined that the impugned classification (“habitual drunkard”) failed to have a rational connection to a legitimate state interest. It asserted: “The absence of a rational relationship between a medical disease and bad moral character therefore renders any classification based on that relationship a violation of the Equal Protection Clause.” Phrased another way, it was irrational for the government to contend that people suffering from chronic alcoholism were morally blameworthy persons solely because of this disease.

The government sought to escape this connection by mounting several questionable positions, which the court rejected at each turn. First, the government argued that the legislation does not exclude a person based on any status but rather on manifested symptoms (habitual and excessive drinking). The court quickly rejected this distinction articulating that: “A statute targeting people who habitually and excessively drink alcohol is, in effect, targeting individuals with chronic alcoholism.” This is like arguing that anti-sodomy laws did not target gay people for being gay but only sexual behaviour they engaged in with someone of the same sex.
 
Second, the government claimed that people suffering from alcoholism were morally blameworthy because they simply lacked the motivation to overcome their disease, thus justifying the denial of relief. In rejecting this argument, the court articulated that this inability to overcome their illness was an old trope refuted by medical literature - namely that the inability to stop drinking was a function of the underlying ailment. The court didn't stop there but characterized the government's opposition to the medical evidence as having “deplorable, troubling, and wholly unacceptable implications.” If one were to take the government's arguments to their logical conclusion, the court stated that many veterans suffering from post-traumatic stress disorder and chronic alcoholism would be deemed to be of bad moral character. 

Third, the government argued that bad moral character flowed from alcoholism by virtue of the increased risk of violent crime and self-harm. The court rejected the argument by first addressing that those who harm themselves or commit suicide do not show poor moral character. In addition, any links between alcoholism and violence the court determined similarly failed to demonstrate bad moral character. By analogy, the court observed that while there is a recognized higher risk of incidence of violence as well as self-harm by those who had bi-polar disorder, no one would argue that people with that disorder would be deemed as being of bad moral character because of the risks associated with that condition. 

Lastly, the government made one last ditch effort to maintain the legitimacy of the law by turning to history. Namely, it argued that habitual drunkards have been targeted through legislation as a way of protecting society since the country's infancy. The court dismantled this position noting that what history demonstrates is a clear animus against chronic alcoholics and those suffering from mental illnesses. Drawing from precedent, the court observed that animus (rooted in history) does not satisfy a legitimate state interest. Near the end of its judgment, the court posited: “We have...been taught through the passage of time that classifying alcoholics as evil people, rather than as individuals suffering from a disease, is neither rational nor consistent with our fundamental values.”

The case highlights but one instance of discrimination that those with disabilities experience in the immigration process. This experience is by no means limited to the United States - indeed there is a long history of excluding disabled persons in other countries, including Canada. While Ledezma-Cosino is situated within the framework of removal proceedings, many face discrimination in other immigration contexts. Immigration policies are often constructed from an ableist perspective and with the view that a disabled person will be a drain on the host country. A person may be denied entry altogether (even for vacation) because, for example, a past history of depression requiring hospitalization. Even where a person has been permitted entry for work purposes and has demonstrated their value to the country, they may be denied a subsequent visa or request for permanent residency due to the perceived economic burden of a disabled child on the state. This has occurred in Australia and Canada. The antipathy toward those with a disability can also transpire where a foreign parent, who while residing in Canada, seeks to sponsor and bring their disabled child into the country. It may make little difference that an individual's actual or potential costs are or will be covered by private insurance or other funding. 
  
If discrimination on the basis of a disability is to be truly seen as prohibited, nations should strongly consider the appropriateness of permitting such discrimination against those seeking entry or to remain in a host country. As scholar-activist Kim Sauder argues: “It’s a little hard to argue that we [as disabled persons] are valued members of society when people are being excluded from the country for being like us.” 

Sunday, 8 May 2016

The Protection Paradox: Why Hasn’t the Arrival of New Media Transformed Refugee Status Determination? By Rosemary Byrne

The International Journal of Refugee Law published an article by Rosemary Byrne entitled: "The Protection Paradox: Why Hasn’t  the Arrival of New Media Transformed  Refugee Status Determination?"

The article is currently available for download for free here. 

The abstract for the article is as follows:

The arrival of new media and communications technology has given rise to a protection paradox for refugees. In principle, it should enhance protection for asylum seekers by developing a more informed RSD process. Instead, it can be argued to have decreased protection for some, as the omnipresence of electronic information is accompanied by a demand in domestic asylum systems for increasingly detailed corroborative evidence to support the particulars of individual claims which many asylum seekers are ill equipped to provide, and that decision makers are disinclined, or insufficiently trained, to assess. In exploring the underlying dynamics of this paradox, this article examines the intersection between new media and the evidentiary regime for refugee protection that is gradually developing in lieu of a dramatic transformation of RSD. It argues that the democratization of human rights documentation and the arrival of new technologies and actors gives rise to novel forms of evidence and a different type of asylum seeker, introducing electronic evidence (e evidence) and the electronic dissident (e dissident) into RSD. The implications of e evidence and e dissidence for RSD include: an emerging duty to corroborate e documentation in protection cases; a need to consider the effect of the cyberactivity by decision makers (the ‘googling judge’) and asylum claimants outside of the RSD process, on disclosure and the admission of evidence within the assessment process; and, the knowledge to evaluate the risk of e dissidence and the changing features of sur place claims in the era of instant on-line dissent. The protection paradox could be diminished when the potential of new media to transform RSD is realized by realigning the approach to e evidence in the asylum process with the advanced practices developed across human rights sectors in the creation, filtering, assessment, and preservation of e evidence.

Tuesday, 16 February 2016

"The visual dehumanisation of refugees" by Roland Bleiker, David Campbell, Emma Hutchison & Xzarina Nicholson

A few years back, the Australian Journal of Political Science published the following article which is certainly apropos today. The article is entitled: "The visual dehumanisation of refugees". It was co-written by Roland Bleiker, David Campbell, Emma Hutchison & Xzarina Nicholson. It is available here. The following is the abstract:

Dealing with refugees is one of the most contested political issues in Australia. We examine how media images of asylum seekers have framed ensuing debates during two crucial periods over the past decade. By conducting a content analysis of newspaper front pages we demonstrate that asylum seekers have primarily been represented as medium or large groups and through a focus on boats. We argue that this visual framing, and in particular the relative absence of images that depict individual asylum seekers with recognisable facial features, associates refugees not with a humanitarian challenge, but with threats to sovereignty and security. These dehumanising visual patterns reinforce a politics of fear that explains why refugees are publicly framed as people whose plight, dire as it is, nevertheless does not generate a compassionate political response.

Monday, 8 February 2016

Darryl Li's New Article in the UCLA Law Review: "Offshoring the Army: Migrant Workers and the U.S. Military"

The UCLA Law Review has published an article by Darryl Li entitled: "Offshoring the Army: Migrant Workers and the U.S. Military." The following is the abstract:

Long-running debates over military privatization overlook one important fact: Te U.S. military’s post-2001 contractor workforce is composed largely of migrants imported from impoverished countries. This Article argues that these Third Country National (TCN) workers—so called because they are neither American nor local—are bereft of the effective protections of American law, local regimes, or their home governments; moreover, their vulnerability is a feature, not a flaw, in how the U.S. projects global power today. TCN workers are an offshore captive labor force whose use allows the government to keep politically sensitive troop numbers and casualty figures artificially low while reducing dependence on local populations with suspect loyalties. Legislation to combat human trafficking has done little to remedy exploitation and abuse of TCN workers because of jurisdictional hurdles and the lack of robust labor rights protections. Substantive reform efforts should address the deeper issue at stake, namely that the government uses TCN workers to carry out a core state function—namely, the use of force—without a clear relationship of responsibility to them. Unlike with soldiers, the labor of TCN workers is not valorized as sacrifice and unlike mercenaries selling their services to the highest bidder, they are frequently indebted to the point of indenture.

Tuesday, 24 November 2015

LES DÉPLACÉS DES CHAGOS. RETOUR SUR LA LUTTE DE CES HABITANTS POUR RÉCUPÉRER LEUR TERRE ANCESTRALE BY Caecilia Alexandre & Konstantia Koutouki

In the most recent edition of the Quebec Journal of International Law (La Revue québécoise de droit international), the QJIL published an article entitled "LES DÉPLACÉS DES CHA GOS . RETOUR SUR LA LUTTE  DE  CES HABITANTS  POUR RÉCUPÉRER LEUR  TERRE  ANCESTRALE" and written by Caecilia Alexandre & Professor Konstantia Koutouki. The following is the English abstract of the article:

This article gives us a complete overview of the little known story of the Chagos archipelago, a story which is vital to the understanding of why the former inhabitants of the archipelago are fighting so vigorously to return home following the installation of an Anglo-American military base on one of the archipelago’s islands, Diego Garcia and why their right to return is well-founded under national and international legal principles. This article also discusses the political context of the installation of the military base and how this impacts the options the Chagossians have on national and international levels to defend their rights.      

Saturday, 12 September 2015

Sponsors are doing more while the Canadian government does less

A drowned boy has angered the world. In Canada this is mingled with the particular knowledge that an effort to sponsor the Kurdi family to Canada failed. As Canadians we wish more had been done and want to do more. Everyone is talking about sponsoring refugees. We are reminded in the media that this is the Canadian way. If this moment of realization brings more Canadians into the sponsorship community, this is cause for hope and increased protection. But individual Canadians do not, and should not, bear the weight of responsibility here.

Responsibility lies with the Canadian government and while individual Canadians have already been doing more, the government is increasingly doing less.

Canada, like other countries, offers a government resettlement program that brings refugees to Canada. This is in contrast to refugees arriving in Canada on their own and claiming asylum. Resettlement is a means of recognizing that not all refugees can cross borders to safety, and that certain parts of the world face greater refugee flows than others. In Canada, we are particularly far away and hard to get to. The Syrian refugees now flooding into Europe by the thousands highlight just how far Canada is from this crisis.

Private sponsorship, unique to Canada, was created almost 40 years ago as a complement to the Canadian government program of refugee resettlement. Sponsors use the term “additionality” and a statement by the Canadian Refugee Sponsorship Agreement Holders Association on September 4, 2015 concluded, “All private sponsorships should be in addition to the Government’s commitment.” Yet it seems that the Canadian government has forgotten this concept of additionality over the last 5 years.

In 2010, the government announced an increase to Canada’s resettlement program of up to 2,500 spaces per year. A cause for celebration, except that only 500 spots were government and 2,000 were private sponsorship. For the numbers to be realized, sponsors would be responsible for 80% of the increase and costs. With the 2012 Budget, the government shifted 1,000 refugee spaces from the government program to private sponsors. In 2013, the government announced an initial commitment to resettle 1,300 Syrian refugees by the end of 2014. This number included a mere 200 government spots with the remaining 1,100 refugees expected to arrive through private sponsorship. The private sponsorship commitment, made on behalf of sponsors by the Canadian government, was the 5th largest confirmed pledge for the admission of Syrian refugees received by UNHCR by June 2014. The Canadian government promise meanwhile ranked 10th. While the government can increase quotas and announce grand expansions, with the numbers allocated to private sponsorship, it remains up to individual Canadians to voluntarily take on the personal and financial responsibility to bring the refugees to Canada

The current government promise to resettle 10,000 Syrian refugees is not a new response. This number was announced back in January, is spread out over 3 years, and once again put 60% of the responsibility on private sponsors. A further campaign pledge of 10,000 refugees “from the region” was made in early August and new promises are now being made. While this will bring some Syrians to safety in Canada, the arrivals will remain the result of private efforts and not an engaged government response.

As the government asks sponsors to shoulder more responsibility for resettlement, one would assume they are making sponsorship easier. And yet the opposite is true. A 2011 change that limits eligibility for certain sponsorships to refugees recognized by UNHCR or a state reportedly stymied the Kurdi family. This sort of recognition is a practical impossibility for UNHCR in mass flow populations such as Syrians. The government also introduced caps on submissions in 2011 and 2012 rather than increased resources to address an application backlog. Essentially, sponsors want to resettle too many people.

When the government cut refugee health care in 2012, it reduced the care for privately sponsored refugees to urgent or essential services only while refugees resettled by the government retained extended coverage. Even following a successful challenge of the health care cuts in federal court, interim measures introduced by the government still offer less health coverage to privately sponsored refugees than to the refugees resettled by the government.

Private sponsorship is an incredible tool for Canadians to offer protection to refugees in need. The private response should be a powerful signal to the government to do more. Instead the government asks more and offers less. Rather than additionality, sponsors face the reality that if they don’t act, fewer refugees will arrive in Canada. So, please, gather your friends and start sponsoring, but demand of our government that they too do more.